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case, the Superior Court of Delaware after admitting that the older rule
originally evolved as dictum, nevertheless rejected the reasoning of the
Rodgers case, and refused to enforce the tax law. Apparently the Delaware court felt that such a change must come from the legislature. On the
other hand the Supreme Court of Arkansas believes that the so called
modern trend of allowing enforcement as a matter of comity is now the
majority view. 23 The American Law Institute lends its weight to this
belief in its 1948 Supplement to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
Whereas the 1934 edition read, "No action can be maintained by a foreign state to enforce its license or revenue laws, or claims for taxes, '2 4 the
1948 Supplement provides, "The Institute expresses no opinion whether
an action can be maintained by a foreign state on a claim for taxes. '25
When it is considered that practically all the American cases favoring the
doctrine of non-enforcement of foreign revenue laws have arisen in the
State of New York, while those supporting the modern doctrine have
arisen in four separate jurisdictions, it is evident that the Arkansas court
might be correct.
23 State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d 150,
152 (1955).
24 Rest., Conflict of Laws §610 c (1934).

25 Rest., Conflict of Laws §610 c (Supp., 1948).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ORDINANCE REQUIRING
PERMIT TO SOLICIT MEMBERSHIP FOR A UNION
INVALID AS PRIOR RESTRAINT
Defendant, a salaried employee of the International Ladies Garment
Workers Union, was attempting to organize the employees of a manufacturing company located in the town of Hazelhurst, Georgia. Many of
these employees lived in Baxley, a nearby city. An ordinance of the City
of Baxley provided that no one could lawfully solicit membership for any
union or other organization requiring membership fees before first securing a permit from the Mayor and City Council. This permit could be
granted or denied on the basis of the character of the applicant, the nature
of the organization, and its effects upon the "general welfare" of the citizens.1 Defendant went to Baxley and, without applying for a permit as
1 The Baxley ordinance is set out in the instant case at 78 S. Ct. 277, 278 (1958). "Section I. Before any person or persons, firms or organizations shall solicit membership for
any organization, union or society of any sort which requires from its members the
payment of membership fees, dues or is entitled to make assessment against its members,
such person or persons shall make application in writing to Mayor and Council of the
City of Baxley for the issuance of a permit to solicit members in such organization
from among the citizens of Baxley .... Section IV. In passing upon such application
the Mayor and Council shall consider the character of the applicant, the nature of the
business of the organization for which members are desired to be solicited, and its
effects upon the general welfare of citizens of the City of Baxley...."
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required under the ordinance, talked with several employees at their
homes about joining the union. Charged with the violation of the ordinance, the defendant was convicted despite her contention that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The judgment was affirmed in the lower State courts, and the Supreme Court of Georgia denied certiorari. The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding the ordinance invalid because it created, in the
city officials, a power of arbitrary suppression of, and prior restraint upon
freedom of speech. Staub v. City of Baxley, 78 S.Ct. 277 (1958).
The freedoms of speech, press, assembly, religion and petition guaranteed by the First Amendment are within the liberties safeguarded by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, from invasion by state
action. 2 Accordingly, it has been held that a state, by denying freedom of
thought and speech, denies "due process of law." A municipal ordinance,
adopted under state authority, has been held to constitute "state action"
4
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Since municipal ordinances are within the prohibition of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it becomes necessary to ascertain the criteria applied by the
Supreme Court in past cases dealing with the constitutionality of city
licensing laws.
Though a municipality may enact regulations in the interest of the public safety, health, welfare or convenience, 5 the regulations may not abridge
the individual liberties secured by the Constitution to those who wish to
write, speak, print or circulate information or opinion. 6 Thus, statutes or
ordinances prohibiting the solicitation of persons to join an organization
or society, or to pay membership dues or fees, have been held invalid as
violating the constitutional right of freedom of speech. 7 On the other
hand, city ordinances which forbid unlicensed door to door solicitation or
selling without the consent of the owners or occupiers do not contravene
8
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an ordinance which makes
the peaceful enjoyment of First Amendment freedoms contingent upon
2Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
3 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
4Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938); Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
5Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
6 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
7 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Pittman v. Nix, 152 Fla. 378, 11 So.2d 791
(1943).
8 Beard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); City of Manchester v. Leiby,
117 F.2d 661 (C.A. 1st, 1941).
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the arbitrary discretion of a state or city official in granting a license or
permit is unconstitutional and invalid, as being a prior restraint upon the
enjoyment of these freedoms. An illustration of this general holding is
Cantwell v. Connecticut." In that case, an Act prohibited the solicitation
for "any religious, charitable or philanthropic cause" without approval of
the "cause" by the Secretary of the Public Welfare Council of the state.
The Supreme Court held the legislation invalid and unconstitutional, since
it gave the Secretary arbitrary discretion in determining what was a "religious, charitable or philanthropic cause," and therefore constituted a prior
restraint on the freedom of religion. Speaking for a unanimous court, Mr.
Justice Roberts said:
He [Secretary] is not to issue a certificate as a matter of course. His decision

to issue or refuse it involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the
formation of an opinion. He is authorized to withhold his approval if he determines that the cause is not a religious one.... To condition the solicitation of
aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant
of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is
a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of the liberty

protected by the Constitution.' 0

As contrasted to the cases involving religious groups,1 1 there have been
only a few Supreme Court decisions relating to the constitutionality of
city and state regulation of union membership solicitation. However, the
following two cases bear an instructive relationship to the instant case.
The 1939 case of Hague v. C.I.O.12 dealt with a city ordinance which
prohibited the leasing of a hall for a public speech or the holding of public
meetings without a permit from the Chief of Police. Members of a labor
union sought permission to hold public meetings in the city for the "organization of unorganized workers into labor unions.' ' la Permission was
refused on the ground that such meetings would cause disorder. The labor
union members then procured an injunction against the city restraining it
from interfering with their rights of free speech and peaceable assembly.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the restraining order. Mr. Justice Roberts said:
[U]ncontrolled official suppression of the privilege [free speech and assembly]
cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with
the exercise of the right.14

To the same effect is the 1945 Supreme Court decision in Thomas v.
Collins.15 A Texas Statute forbade the solicitation of memberships in labor
9310 U.S. 296 (1940).
10 Ibid., at 305, 307.
11 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Nienotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);
Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
12 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
14 Ibid., at 516.
13 Ibid., at 504.
15 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
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unions without first obtaining an orginizer's card. Defendant, a C.I.O.
vice president, in Texas on a temporary visit, addressed a public meeting
inviting workers to join his organization. This was done in violation of a
temporary restraining order issued because defendant refused to fulfill the
requirements of the statute. In holding the statute invalid as a prior restraint on freedom of speech and assembly, and in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court said:
The case confronts us ...to say where the individual's freedom ends and the

State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps
more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the
preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic
freedoms secured by the First Amendment.... That priority gives these liberties
a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the character of the right not of the limitation, which determines what standard governs
the choice. For these reasons, any attempt to restrict those liberties must be
justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by
clear and present danger.
The right thus to discuss and inform people concerning the advantages and
disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected not only as a part of free
speech, but as part of free assembly. 10
The factual situation closest to the instant case is that in the 1946 California decision of In re Porterfield.17 There, a city ordinance made it unlawful to solicit membership for any organization requiring payment of
dues, without first obtaining a license from the city council. The license
would issue only, "If the city council is satisfied that said applicant is of
good moral character and will not resort to force

. . .

or corrupt means in

his proposed work of solicitation ...."I Defendant, a labor union representative, was convicted for violating the ordinance. In allowing his petition for habeas corpus, the California court held that the standards for
granting a license were indefinite and:
[P]rovide a mechanism for the deprival of constitutional rights, not only on
the basis of the guaranties applicable to free speech but also on the basis of those

protecting the right to engage in lawful fashion in a lawful activity .... Satis-

faction may be circumscribed by individual whim, caprice, or personal prejudice. 19
Considering the language of the Baxley ordinance, it must be concluded
that the instant case clearly echoes the spirit and rationale of the foregoing
decisions. The Supreme Court has displayed not the slightest inclination
to deviate from the policy it has established throughout the years, in safeguarding the First Amendment freedoms from arbitrary impairment by
state laws or municipal ordinances.
16

Ibid., at 529, 530, 532.

17 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P.2d 706 (1946).
18 Ibid., at 711.

19 Ibid., at 719.

